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Exploring Governance Issues On Collaborative Contracts In 
The Construction Industry* 
 
Chen Le1 Manley Karen2 Lewis Joanne3 
 
Abstract: This paper reports the findings of an in-depth literature review, which was designed as the first phase of a study that ultimately 
aims to rank the importance of key governance mechanisms on collaborative construction projects, in terms of impact on value-for-money. The 
absence of such information in the global knowledge base has prompted the current study. Seminal research completed recently concluded that 
deductive evidence with regard to the performance outcomes of collaborative procurement mechanisms is currently limited (Eriksson and 
Westerberg 2011). The authors aim to address this gap in current understanding.  
The literature review identifies key features of both formal and informal mechanisms which have been applied within collaborative 
contracting contexts. The literature review lays a solid foundation for designing a deductive research strategy to be implemented in the second 
phase of the study, which will employ a large-scale quantitative survey to shed light on the governance structures of collaborative contracts, and 
the ways in which they impact on realisation of VfM during project delivery in the Australian infrastructure industry. The current paper aims to 
identify the main categories of formal and informal governance mechanisms currently being employed globally. This will provide structure for 
the development of the survey in the second phase of the study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Over decade, collaborative contracts have been 
established as relatively
the past 
 common procurement methods for 
infrastructure delivery in Australia due to their advantages over 
conventional contracts (Morwood et al. 2008). Through applying 
relational contracting principles, project delivery vehicles such as 
‘project alliance’ and ‘Early Contractor Involvement (ECI)’ have 
delivered significant community, environmental and social 
outcomes in conjunction with effective cost management and 
innovation (Hauck et al. 2004; Love et al. 2010; Manley 2002).  
Collaborative contracting approaches are constantly evolving 
to suit market change driven by owners and project specifics (Chan 
et al. 2010; Morwood et al. 2008). Hence, it is necessary to 
continue to improve upon the existing understanding of 
transactional governance approaches, so as to enhance the potential 
for collaborative procurement methods to optimise value when 
applied in the Australian infrastructure industry. The governance 
structures of collaborative contracts comprise distinct 
combinations of formal and informal governance mechanisms, 
where different combinations are applied within different 
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transactional contexts to achieve optimal value for money (VfM) 
(Chan et al. 2010). However, empirical evidence has not yet been 
established to clearly identify the most effective combinations of 
formal and informal governance mechanisms when applied during 
infrastructure transactions in Australia. This is despite calls from 
prominent industry players to investigate the optimal form of the 
governance structure and its theoretical underpinnings (Department 
of Treasury and Finance 2009).  
In parallel with the increasing adoption of collaborative 
contracts for infrastructure delivery, the literature suggests that 
there is ongoing ambivalence about a) whether some formal 
governance mechanisms have a positive or negative impact on 
value for money (VfM) (target outturn cost is a typical example), 
and b) whether there is an optimal combination of formal and 
informal governance mechanisms to optimise VfM (e.g. 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Ross 2008). The 
literature review results presented in the current paper, provide a 
basis for investigating these questions in later work.  
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHODS FOR LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
This literature review was undertaken to achieve two primary 
objectives. The first objective was to identify the essential features 
of both formal and informal mechanisms which have been applied 
within a collaborative contracting context. Special attention was 
paid to the mechanisms which are associated with industry 
practices in Australia. The second objective was to seek evidence 
for the mechanisms’ influence on VfM. The findings of the 
literature review will be used to help to operationally define the 
constructs and variables, and to propose hypotheses for further 
deductive investigation in the second phase of this study.  
The approach used to review the literature was directed 
content analysis (Krippendorff 2004). This approach uses well 
 
 
established theories and findings of prior research to identify key 
concepts and variables as initial coding categories (Krippendorff 
2004). Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis software, was used to 
support the systematic process of coding and identifying themes 
(Dyer and Singh 1998). The literature review involved three steps, 
as detailed below.  
The first step of the review drew on transaction-cost 
economics theory (Williamson 1979; 1991), relational contract 
theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000), social psychology theory 
(e.g. Gulati 1995) and strategic alliances literature (e.g. Gulati and 
Singh 1998; Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009; Krishnan and Martin 
2006; Luo 2007) to provide an understanding of the nature and 
governance structures of collabrative contracts. These four areas 
were targeted because they emerged as the most promising given 
the topic. They were identified through a high-level content 
analysis sweep of a broad range of likely academic areas. The 
understandings they yielded subsequently led to the 
conceptualisation of ‘formal mechanisms’ and ‘informal 
mechanisms’. Coding categories and performance measures 
defined in the strategic alliancing literature (Ferguson et al. 2005; 
Gulati and Singh 1998; Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009; Luo 2007) 
were used as a benchmark to help define the two types of 
governance arrangements of relevance in the collaborative 
contracting context.  
The second step of the review focused on construction 
managment literature, to disaggregate the governance 
arrangements into more specific categories. The review targeted 
papers published between 2000 to 2012 by construction 
management journals reporting studies related to alliances, 
cooperative procurement, relational contract and partnering. 
Following the methods used by key published conceptual and 
literature review studies (e.g. Ke et al. 2009; Yeung et al. 2007) the 
review canvassed papers published in Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management; Journal of Management in 
Engineering; Construction Management and Economics; 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management; 
International Journal of Project Management; and The 
Engineering Economist. The review especially paid attention to the 
studies, both conceptual (e.g. Eriksson and Westerberg 2011; 
Lahdenperä 2012) and empirical (e.g. Love et al. 2010; Rahman 
and Kumaraswamy 2008), about the essential factors that affect the 
success of collaborative procurement approaches. Some success 
factors such as trust, attitude, win-win philosophy, cooperative 
culture and open communication are latent cognitive elements 
which need to be activated by governance mechanisms 
(Lahdenperä 2012). The content analysis undertaken here focused 
on those mechanisms. The analysis derived seven coding 
categories for formal mechanisms:  ‘negotiated cost’, ‘competitive 
cost’, ‘commercial framework’, ‘risk and reward sharing regime’, 
‘qualitative performance measurement’, ‘collaborative multi-party 
agreement’, and ‘early contractor involvement’; and four coding 
categories for informal mechanisms: ‘leadership structure’, 
‘integrated team’, ‘team workshops’ and ‘joint management 
system’.  
The third step of the review is yet to be undertaken. That will 
involve identifying the specific mechanisms associated with each 
governance category that have the potential to influence VfM. In 
addition to the literature reviewed in steps one and two, this step 
will consider government publications (e.g. Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2010; 2011; Department of Treasury 
and Finance 2009) and industry guidelines and reports (e.g. 
Australian Constructors Association 1999; Morwood et al. 2008) 
to identify fine-grained governance mechanisms that impact VfM 
in the Australia infrastructure industry.  
Overall the methods for the current paper involved a coding 
process cross-referenced between three researchers, which 
continued until the number of new catgories found, and the new 
descriptions found, substantially diminished with further reading 
or cross referencing. The content analysis covered assessment of 
hundreds of journal papers, books, government documents, and 
industry reports.  
 
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONTRACTS 
 
3.1. Relational Nature of Collaborative Contracts  
 
Delivery of a specialised infrastructure design can extend over a 
long project duration and involves a complex combination of 
idiosyncratic goods and services, where “investments of 
transaction specific human and physical capital are made and, 
contingent upon successful execution, benefits are realised” 
(Williamson 1979, p241). Under these circumstances, successful 
infrastructure delivery relies on investment of human capital from 
a wide range of professional services, such as finance, surveying, 
and construction management, which  require specialist training 
and learning-by-doing (Anumba et al. 2005). As a result, effective 
maintenance of the relationship between the client and service 
providers becomes a prerequisite for realising effective, cost 
efficient project delivery (Lahdenperä 2012; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2004). Hence, relational contracts are needed 
(Williamson 1979) to manage the non-marketability challenges 
associated with infrastructure transactions, where duration, 
complexity and uncertainty are rapidly increasing in the 21st 
century (Berendsa 2006; Chan et al. 2010; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2004).  
Collaborative contracts are a type of relational contract and 
have been developed as an innovative project procurement method 
that aligns with the theoretical propositions of a relational contract, 
where “the contract is fundamentally about cooperative social 
behaviour, and that contracts containing significant relational 
elements are the dominant form of contracting” (Feinman 2000, 
p743). The primary infrastructure delivery approaches that apply 
collaborative contracting principles include the ‘project alliance’ 
approach, and forms of ‘integrated project delivery’ such as early 
contractor involvement, early tender involvement, and cost-plus 
incentive fee (Berendsa 2006; Chan et al. 2010; Department of 
Treasury and Finance 2009; Eriksson and Pesämaa 2007; 
Lahdenperä 2012; Morwood et al. 2008). These approaches have 
been used to achieve specific savings through managing the 
interface between the client and service providers as contracts are 
successively adapted to unfolding market conditions (Hauck et al. 
2004; Love et al. 2010; Morwood et al. 2008; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2004). 
 
 
3.2. Transaction Costs and Collaborative Contracts 
 
Many infrastructure projects are characterised by a high level of 
durable transaction-specific investment and a high degree of 
uncertainty (Lahdenperä 2009; Morwood et al. 2008). The 
transaction costs associated with exchanges such as this are too 
high to justify the use of conventional contracts (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2004), which are more suitable for simple and 
standardised projects with low uncertainty (Eriksson 2008). 
According to transaction-cost economics theory, a complex 
governance structure  (Williamson 1979) is required to protect 
 
 
project participants from a partner’s opportunism, and also serves 
as a framework to sustain cooperation between partners 
(Williamson 1991). In addition, coordination costs, which are 
associated with the decomposition of tasks, the division of labour 
and the coordination of activities across organisational boundaries, 
also create considerable uncertainties in complex infrastructure 
projects (Gulati and Singh 1998).  
Reflecting Gulati and Singh’s (1998) arguments within the 
context of project delivery, the strong interdependence between 
project participants during complex project delivery is likely result 
in high expected coordination costs, and also influences the extent 
of appropriation concerns (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2004). 
Transaction cost economists suggest that more hierarchical 
contracts are likely to be employed to address the anticipated 
coordination costs, and to manage potential moral hazards, when 
participants anticipate uncertainty and appropriation concerns in 
the behaviour of their business partners (Gulati and Singh 1998). 
In line with these positions, collaborative contracts adopt hybrid 
governance structures that contain both market and hierarchical 
mechanisms (Williamson 1991) to facilitate the negotiation and 
execution of both physical and human capital transactions (Chan et 
al. 2010; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2004). Hierarchical 
mechanisms include performance measurement for example, while 
the market mechanisms include depersonalised exchange for 
example. 
 
 
3.3. Formal and Informal Governance for 
Collaborative Contracts  
 
Physical capital is easily codified (written down) and transmitted, 
thus its transactions are suitably controlled by formal governance 
mechanisms (hereafter referred to as ‘formal mechanisms’) 
(Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). On the contrary, human capital 
transactions are idiosyncratic (Williamson 1979) due to the tacit 
nature of the knowledge and the cognitive context involved (Grant 
and Baden-Fuller 2004; Nooteboom 2009). Hence, human capital  
is likely to be most suitably controlled by informal governance 
mechanisms (hereafter referred to as ‘informal mechanisms’), 
which focus on relationships (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009; 
Macneil 2000). The two types of mechanisms can be distinguished 
based on “the degree to which the operation of the mechanism can 
be separated from the specific people and their relationships,” as 
well as “the degree to which the mechanism can stipulate a specific 
outcome or behaviour” (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009, p1027). 
Informal mechanisms typically relate to specific relationships or 
behaviour.  
Formal  mechanisms include both market mechanisms, such 
as formal contracts and depersonalised exchange (Ferguson et al. 
2005; Williamson 1991), and hierarchical mechanisms such as 
performance measurement and  dispute resolution procedures 
(Gulati and Singh 1998). Formal mechanisms often include 
contractual incentives for clear and equitable risk allocation 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). Formal mechanisms are 
largely independent of the specific people involved and can specify 
outcomes (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009).  
By comparison, informal mechanisms include people and 
social-based hierarchical mechanisms (Gulati and Singh 1998) for 
enhancing mutual trust, open communication, cooperation and 
knowledge sharing (Love et al. 2010; Yeung et al. 2007). Informal 
mechanisms are applied as non-contractual stimuli designed to 
enable equitable allocation of risk through influencing participant 
attitudes  (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008), and are tightly 
bound to the specific individuals and their relationships (Hoetker 
and Mellewigt 2009). Hence the outcomes of informal mechanisms 
largely depend upon interactions between individual participants 
and cannot be pre-specified (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). In 
addition, Gulati and Singh (1998) observed within the setting of 
strategic alliances, that informal mechanisms such as authority 
systems, command structures, and standard operating procedures 
institutionalise interactions between partners, and can thus can be 
used to address concerns such as anticipated coordination costs and 
appropriation threats, without the need for formal mechanisms, 
such as contractual terms. Key empirical findings derived within 
the context of collaborative contracting (e.g. Berendsa 2006; 
Hauck et al. 2004; Love et al. 2010) also support this argument to a 
certain degree.  
 
 
3.4. Trust on Collaborative Contracts 
 
Both formal and informal governance mechanisms influence the 
formation of trust on projects, as do contextual factors, such as the 
extent to which partners have worked together in the past. In 
addition to the detailed contract, trust is necessary for improving 
the predictability of partner behaviour (Gulati 1995; Gulati and 
Singh 1998). In a social structure of trusting relationships, partners 
are likely to have lower appropriation concerns (Gulati and Singh 
1998). Further, repeated ties built from prior contracts engender 
trust that helps to counteract fear of opportunistic behaviour 
(Gulati 1995). Empirical evidence shows that prior history of 
cooperation between firms (considered as an indicator of trust) 
affects the governance of subsequent contracts, for example 
resulting in lower levels of contractual safeguards (Gulati 1995). It 
was also found that experiences of prior cooperation influence the 
attitudes of contractors and clients towards adopting risk allocation 
mechanisms based on a ‘trust relationship’ (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2008). This implies that governance structures may 
be context specific depending on the prior cooperative experience 
of clients and service providers.  
From an equity theory perspective, formal and informal 
governance mechanisms are designed to establish distributive, 
procedural and interactional justice within cooperative 
transactional contexts for the purpose of realising desired joint 
performance (Luo 2007). Formal mechanisms are primarily 
designed to establish distributive justice and seek to ensure fair 
inter-party sharing of the rewards from cooperation based on 
contribution, commitment and assumption of responsibility. 
Informal governance mechanisms pertaining to leadership structure 
and joint management systems are mainly designed to build 
procedural justice and ensure the fairness of the strategic decision-
making process and procedures (Luo 2007). Informal mechanisms 
pertaining to team integration  aim to develop interactional justice, 
ensuring that the interpersonal treatment and information exchange 
project participants is fair (Luo 2007).  
The organisational justice established by the governance 
structure builds mutual trust, win-win philosophy, collaborative 
culture and enables open communication (Lahdenperä 2012; Love 
et al. 2010; Yeung et al. 2007). These essential success factors help 
to create a cognitive project environment (Foss and Michailova 
2009; Nooteboom 2009) that is conducive to innovative design and 
construction and superior project performance (Eriksson and 
Westerberg 2011; Manley 2002; Manley and McFallan 2006; 
Manley et al. 2009).  
 
 
3.5. VfM on Collaborative Contracts 
 
 
 
The ultimate purpose of the governance structure is to achieve the 
client’s VfM at a fair cost (Chan et al. 2010; Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Department of Treasury and 
Finance 2009). The primary challenge associated with the 
formulation and execution of a collaborative contract lies in 
creating a governance structure with an appropriate combination of 
formal and informal mechanisms (Lahdenperä 2012; Yeung et al. 
2007). Ideally, this combination must be  capable of building 
common behaviours and norms with sufficient strength to sustain 
the relationships  between the client and service providers for the 
duration of project delivery (Macneil 2000). 
VfM measures the client’s benefits (with respect to quality, 
social and environmental performance outcomes),  and is balanced 
against the cost (price and risk exposure) of achieving those 
benefits (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2009). According to key 
advice in the UK (HM Treasury 2006), VfM is defined as the 
optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness 
for purpose) of the good or service to meet the user’s requirement. 
VfM is not the choice of goods and services based on the lowest-
cost bid. VfM should be considered on a ‘whole-of-life’ or ‘total-
cost-of-ownership’ basis (Chan et al. 2010; Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Department of Treasury and 
Finance 2009).  
The formulation of cost and non-cost performance measures 
is governed by the client’s VfM statement (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Morwood et al. 2008). Project 
performance indicators therefore reflect the extent to which both 
formal and informal mechanisms are implemented to achieve VfM. 
In industry practice, project performance measures have been be 
used to assess the degree to which collaborative procurement 
achieves VfM across a wide range of transactional contexts 
(Eriksson and Westerberg 2011). A similar approach has been 
adopted by strategic alliance studies where the collaborative 
performance of transactors is used as an indicative measure of the 
VfM achieved (Dyer 1997; Ireland et al. 2002). These approaches 
provide a workable definition of VfM, even though a commonly 
accepted definition of ‘value for money’ is difficult to find 
(MacDonald 2011), and even though VfM statements vary in 
different projects (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 
2011; Morwood et al. 2008). 
Hybrid governance, which includes formal and informal 
mechanisms, can provide important value-creating potential 
through managing uncertainty and ambiguity, increasing symmetry 
of information flows between organisational boundaries, building 
trust and reducing coordination costs (Ireland et al. 2002). Both 
economic/structural and social/relational governance mechanisms 
influence the performance of transactions (Dyer 1997; Gulati 1995; 
Krishnan and Martin 2006; Reuer and Ariño 2002). Value is 
maximised when the combined performance of both types of 
mechanism are optimised (Dyer 1997).  
 
 
4.  IDENTIFYING GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 
CATEGORIES 
 
The main aim of the literature review undertaken here is to identify 
categories of formal and informal governance mechanisms that are 
important to VfM, clearly defined and mutually exclusive. The 
content analysis of the literature, as described in the methods 
section of this paper, enabled identification of key important 
categories of governance mechanisms, which are shown in Table 1. 
The categories shown in Table 1 will facilitate the design of a 
rigorous questionnaire to uncover the optimal balance of such 
mechanisms in the Australian infrastructure context. 
Table 1: Categories of formal and informal governance 
mechanisms 
Formal Mechanisms Informal Mechanisms 
Negotiated cost Leadership structure 
Competitive cost Integrated team 
Commercial framework Team Workshops 
Financial risk and reward sharing regime Joint management system 
Qualitative performance measurement  
Collaborative multi-party agreement  
Early contractor involvement  
 
 
4.1. Applying Formal Mechanism Categories  
 
The application of formal governance categories is outlined below 
within the context of two collaborative project delivery methods: 
project alliance and ECI.  
4.1.1 Project Alliances 
 
The project alliance approach is typically chosen to provide better 
risk management when a high degree of uncertainty is involved in 
both the development and delivery phases, and therefore requires 
an ongoing collaboration between the client and service providers 
(Morwood et al. 2008). In an alliance project, the project cost is 
collectively estimated and negotiated during the Target Cost 
Estimate (TCE) phase by an integrated team comprising the client, 
designers, contractors and other service providers (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Lahdenperä 2009; Morwood et 
al. 2008; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). As an output of the 
TCE, the target outturn cost (TOC) is developed to represent the 
expected cost of the project’s scope at completion (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Morwood et al. 2008). The 
client may determine the TOC with only one preferred proponent 
team (i.e. single TOC approach) or more than one proponent team 
(i.e. multiple TOC approach) (Lahdenperä 2010). These two 
approaches and various hybrids between them are employed to 
ensure competitive costs are achieved (Department of Treasury and 
Finance 2009; Lahdenperä 2010; Love et al. 2010; Morwood et al. 
2008).  
The commercial framework of an alliance contract is typically 
comprised of three components: direct costs and project specific 
overheads; the fee for the service providers, including normal 
profit and non-project specific corporate overheads; and the risk 
and reward amount, as determined by the gain-share and pain-
share mechanisms, which measure the project performance against 
the TOC and non-cost related Key Result Areas (KRAs) 
(Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Lahdenperä 
2009; Morwood et al. 2008). KRAs represent the client’s non-price 
objectives, such as facility performance, good safety, and timely 
completion. KRA’s are pre-agreed between the client and service 
providers, and are measured through Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; 
Lahdenperä 2009; Morwood et al. 2008). The pain-share and gain-
share regime enables the parties (including the client) to share 
savings and overruns according to the set TOC, i.e. any cost under- 
or over-run against this TOC are split in pre-agreed, specified 
proportions (Lahdenperä 2010; Yeung et al. 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Early Contractor Involvement 
 
ECI brings the contractor’s knowledge into the planning and 
design process (Australian Constructors Association 1999), 
thereby helping to reduce initial risk uncertainties and achieve a 
realistic risk adjusted price (Edwards 2008). In the first stage of 
ECI, the contractor, designer and client work together to develop 
the design, program, budget and risk allocation model. During this 
collaborative stage, the client bears most of the project risk, and 
the contractor’s obligations are limited to design preparation 
(Edwards 2008). The client may select multiple bidders to 
participate in the scoping and pricing, so as to ensure VfM through 
price competition. Additionally, transparency between parties 
during the development of scope costing and documentation 
enables in-depth discussion and a greater understanding of the 
project requirements (Department of Main Roads 2009). In the 
second stage, the contractor carries out the detailed design and 
documentation, as well as the construction of project works. 
Similarly to project alliances, the contractor in an ECI arrangement 
is financially rewarded for success in some KRAs (Edwards 2008). 
 
4.2. Appling Informal Mechanism Categories  
 
Informal governance categories are applied to collaborative 
contracts in this section, as an example of their operation. A 
collaborative contract framework adopts a special leadership 
structure. For example, in an alliance project, the project board 
provides vision, governance and leadership; the project 
management team drives the operational project delivery under the 
leadership of a project manager; and the wider project team 
implement the project  (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 
2011; Edwards 2008; Morwood et al. 2008). In addition, a wide 
range of informal mechanisms are used to develop an integrated 
project team. At the beginning of the project, the management of 
relationships and culture are included in the high performance plan 
(Morwood et al. 2008). Focused, integrated workshops and 
powerful meeting architecture  are needed to integrate design and 
construction to ensure that project solutions are cost effective and 
innovative (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). Client 
organisations often introduce relationship managers to the project 
team to  align the expectations of and maintain the relationships 
amongst all team members (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). 
Collaborative contract governance helps realise co-operative joint 
decision making through mechanisms that integrate people, 
systems and processes into a joint management system (Eriksson 
and Pesämaa 2007; Hauck et al. 2004; Love et al. 2010). 
Successful integration enables a mutual understanding of 
participants’ culture and procedures, and ultimately facilitates 
organisational alignment (Love et al. 2010). 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Figure 1 below summarises the key categories of governance 
mechanisms in collaborative contracting, and their interaction with 
the project context to influence project performance, and 
indicatively, VfM. The evolution of collaborative contract models 
adopted by the Australian infrastructure industry has been driven 
by a dynamic economic environment, whereby there is no “one 
size fits all” solution (Mignot 2012). Project delivery methods are 
constantly reshaped by market conditions to suit the needs of 
clients, contractors and risk associated with projects (Mignot 2012). 
The market has seen the emergence of new collaborative 
procurement arrangements such as planning alliances, design 
alliances and Early Tender Involvement (ETI) (Mignot 2012). 
These approaches provide effective and flexible solutions to  meet 
market conditions. Presentations at the recent annual convention of 
the Alliancing Association of Australasia (Alliancing Association 
of Australasia 2012) highlighted an emerging trend of the 
“deconstruction” of collaborative delivery models. This involves 
experienced clients configuring the governance structure for each 
project with a unique combination of formal and informal 
mechanisms to optimise VfM and manage risks in a way that is 
specifically tailored to unique project characteristics. This 
investigation into formal and informal governance mechanisms 
and their performance implications will improve our understanding 
of the governance structures of collaborative contracts used by the 
Australia infrastructure industry.  
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Figure 1: Governance structures of collaborative contracts 
 
This paper has investigated a number of issues critical in 
understanding the value of various governance mechanisms in 
terms of their impact on project performance. The relational nature 
of collaborative contracts has been investigated, along with the 
transaction costs to be managed, the formation of trust and the 
impact on value-for-money. Formal and informal governance 
arrangements have been defined and a number of significant 
categories have been identified. The next step is a forthcoming 
paper by the authors which examines each of the eleven categories 
identified here, as a prelude to identifying the individual 
mechanisms within each category and assessing their relative 
importance to project outcomes.  
 
 
References 
 
Alliancing Association of Australasia. (2012). "Alliancing Association 
Australasia Annual Convention." Alliancing Association Australasia, 
Sydney. 
Anumba, C. J., Egbu, C. O., and Carrillo, P. (2005). Knowledge 
Management in Construction, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK. 
Australian Constructors Association. (1999). "Relationship Contracting, 
Optimasing Project Outcomes." Australian Constructors 
Association.<http://www.constructors.com.au/publications.php> (May 
2012) 
Berendsa, T. C. (2006). "Cooperative contracting on major engineering and 
construction projects." The Engineering Economist, 51(1), 35-51. 
 
 
Chan, A. P. C., Chan, D. W., and Yeung, J. F. (2010). Relational 
Contracting for Construction Excellence: Principles, Practices and 
Case Studies, Spon Press, Abingdon. 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport. (2010). "Infrastructure 
Planning and Delivery: Best Practice Case Studies." Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport, Australian Government, Canberra, 
Australia.<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/infrastructure/publications/
files/Best_Practice_Guide.pdf> (June 2012) 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport. (2011). "National Alliance 
Contracting Guidelines, Guide to Alliance Contracting." Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport, Australian 
Government.<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/infrastructure/nacg/inde
x.aspx> (May 2012) 
Department of Main Roads. (2009). "Standard contract provisions (vol. 6): 
Early contractor involvement (ECI) 
contract."<http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/Business-industry/Technical-
standards-publications/Standard-contract-provisions-roads-vol-6-
eci.aspx> (July 2012) 
Department of Treasury and Finance. (2009). "In Pursuit of Additional 
Value: A benchmarking study into alliancing in the Australian Public 
Sector." Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia.<http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/CA25713E0002EF43/WebObj/In
PursuitofAdditionalValue/$File/InPursuitofAdditionalValue.pdf> (May 
2012) 
Dyer, J. H. (1997). "Effective interim collaboration: How firms minimize 
transaction costs and maximise transaction value." Strategic 
Management Journal, 18(7), 535-556. 
Dyer, J. H., and Singh, H. (1998). "The relational view: Cooperative 
strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage." The 
Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660-679. 
Edwards, R. (2008). "Early contractor involvement (ECI) contracts in the 
South Australia transport infrastructure construction 
industry."<http://www.alliancecontractingiq.com/downloadSecureConte
nt.cfm?ID=100> (July 2012) 
Eriksson, P. E. (2008). "Procurement effects on coopetition in client-
contractor relationships." Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 134(2), 103-111. 
Eriksson, P. E., and Pesämaa, O. (2007). "Modelling procurement effects 
on cooperation." Construction Management and Economics, 25(8), 893-
901. 
Eriksson, P. E., and Westerberg, M. (2011). "Effects of cooperative 
procurement procedures on construction project performance: A 
conceptual framework." International Journal of Project Management, 
29(2), 197-208. 
Feinman, J. M. (2000). "Relational contract theory in context." 
Northwestern University Law Review 94(3), 737-748. 
Ferguson, R. J., Paulin, M., and Bergeron, J. (2005). "Contractual 
governance, relational governance, and the performance of interfirm 
service exchanges: The influence of boundary-spanner closeness." 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 33(2), 217-234. 
Foss, N. J., and Michailova, S. (2009). "Knowledge Governance: Processes 
and Perspectives." N. J. Foss and S. Michailova, eds., Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Grant, R. M., and Baden-Fuller, C. (2004). "A knowledge accessing theory 
of strategic alliances." Journal of Management Studies 41(1), 61–84. 
Gulati, R. (1995). "Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of 
repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances." The Academy of 
Management Journal, 38(1), 85-112  
Gulati, R., and Singh, H. (1998). "The architecture of cooperation: 
Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic 
alliances." Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4), 781-814. 
Hauck, A. J., Walker, D. H. T., Hampson, K. D., and Peters, R. J. (2004). 
"Project alliancing at national museum of Australia—collaborative 
process." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
130(1), 143-152. 
HM Treasury. (2006). "Value for Money Assessment Guidance." 
UK.<http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/vfm_assessmentguidance061006opt.pdf> (June 2012) 
Hoetker, G., and Mellewigt, T. (2009). "Choice and performance of 
governance mechanisms: Matching alliance governance to asset type." 
Strategic Management Journal, 30(10), 1025–1044. 
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., and Vaidyanath, D. (2002). "Alliance 
management as a source of competitive advantage." Journal of 
Management, 28(3), 413-446. 
Ke, Y., Wang, S., Chan, A. P. C., and Cheung, E. (2009). "Research trend 
of Public-Private Partnership in construction journals." Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 135(10), 1076-1086. 
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis: An Introduction to its 
Methodology, Sage, London. 
Krishnan, R., and Martin, X. (2006). "When does trust matter to alliance 
performance?" Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 894-917. 
Lahdenperä, P. (2009). "Project Alliance: The Competitive Single Target-
Cost Approach, VTT Tiedotteita – Research Notes 
2472."<http://www.vtt.fi/publications/index.jsp> (June 2012) 
Lahdenperä, P. (2010). "Conceptualizing a two-stage target-cost 
arrangement for competitive cooperation." Construction Management 
and Economics, 28(7), 783-796. 
Lahdenperä, P. (2012). "Making sense of the multi-party contractual 
arrangements of project partnering, project alliancing and integrated 
project delivery." Construction Management and Economics, 30(1), 57-
79. 
Love, P. E. D., Mistry, D., and Davis, P. R. (2010). "Price competitive 
alliance projects: Identification of success factors for public clients." 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 136(9), 947-
956. 
Luo, Y. (2007). "The independent and interactive roles of procedural, 
distributive, and interactional justice in strategic alliances." Academy of 
Management Journal, 50(3), 644-664. 
MacDonald, C. C. (2011). "Value for Money in Project Alliances," PhD, 
RMIT University, Melbourne. 
Macneil, I. R. (2000). "Relational contract theory: Challenges and queries." 
Northwestern University Law Review, 94(3), 877-907. 
Manley, K. (2002). "Partnering and alliancing on road projects in Australia 
and internationally." Road and Transport Research, 37(10), 1751-1764. 
Manley, K., and McFallan, S. (2006). "Exploring the drivers of firm level 
innovation in the construction industry." Construction Management and 
Economics, 24(9), 911-920. 
Manley, K., McFallan, S., and Kajewski, S. (2009). "Relationship between 
construction firm strategies and innovation outcomes." Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 135(8), 764-771. 
Mignot, A. (2012). "Who moved my cheese? Adapting to the changing 
nature of collaboration in infrastructure." Alliancing Association of 
Australasia, Brisbane. 
Morwood, R., Scott, D., and Pitcher, I. (2008). "Alliancing - A 
Participant’s Guide: Real Life Experiences for Constructors, Designers, 
Facilitators and Clients." AECOM (May 2012) 
Nooteboom, B. (2009). A Cognitive Theory of the Firm : Learning, 
Governance and Dynamic Capabilities, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Rahman, M. M., and Kumaraswamy, M. M. (2004). "Contracting 
relationship trends and transitions." Journal of Management in 
Engineering, 20(4), 147-161. 
Rahman, M. M., and Kumaraswamy, M. M. (2008). "Relational contracting 
and teambuilding: Assessing potential contractual and non-contractual 
incentives." Journal of Management in Engineering, 24(1), 48-63. 
Reuer, J. J., and Ariño, A. (2002). "Contractual renegotiations in strategic 
alliances " Journal of Management, 28(1), 47-68. 
Ross, J. (2008). "Price competition in the alliance selection process. 9 
reasons I favour the single DCT approach - a personal perspective." 
Infrastructure Delivery Alliance Forum, Main Roads Western Australia. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979). "Transaction-cost economics: The governance of 
contractual relations." Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233–261. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991). "Comparative economic organization: The 
analysis of discrete structural alternatives." Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 36(2), 269–296. 
Yeung, J. F. Y., Chan, A. P. C., and Chan, D. W. M. (2007). "The 
definition of alliancing in construction as a Wittgenstein family-
resemblance concept." International Journal of Project Management, 
25(3), 219-231. 
 
 
